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1. Introduction  
Performance-related pay and individualized wage setting appears to be on the rise, even in 
economies with strong unions. Following the publication of the seminal article of Holmström 
and Milgrom (1987), performance-based pay became a predominant method of rewarding 
executive managers. But individualized pay and performance-related pay seem to be 
spreading to lower ranks of employees within organizations, and throughout the labor market 
as well, see Lemieux et al. (2006) for recent evidence from the US and Kersley et al. (2006) 
for the UK. Particularly in Europe, where union negotiated, fixed wages have been 
predominant, this development represents an important break with traditional forms of 
remuneration. The implications of institutions and pay schemes on pay, productivity, and the 
distribution of effort are not thoroughly discussed and well understood. This paper develops a 
theoretical framework for analyzing the effects of performance-related pay on within-firm 
wage dispersion, and confronts theory with evidence from a rich employer-employee data set. 
In particular, our focus is on the interaction between performance pay and collective 
bargaining.  
Wage differences among workers with similar qualifications are on the rise as well. 
Autor et al. (2005) conclude that increased within-group inequality accounts for much of the 
increase in the US wage dispersion over the past 30 years. Barth and Lucifora (2005), using 
comparable micro data from 15 European countries over 20 years, find evidence of similar 
trends in Europe. Different explanations have been put forward, but the relative impact of 
demand and supply factors versus institutional factors both on levels and trends in wage 
inequality across countries remains to be determined. DiNardo et al. (1996) conclude that a 
decline in unionism contributed to a considerable portion of the increase in wage inequality in 
the United States. Kahn (2000) argues that differences in collective coverage explain a large 
part of the observed differences in wage dispersion across countries.  
An expansion of individualized and performance-related pay systems is yet another 
possible explanation for a widening wage distribution. In its simplest form, the argument is 
that wages become more dispersed when pay more closely reflects individual performance 
heterogeneity, stemming from differences in talent, skills, effort, and even luck. Indeed, 
Lemieux et al. (2006) conclude that ‘growing incidence of performance pay accounts for 25 
percent of the growth in [the US] male wage inequality between the late 1970s and early 
1990s.”  
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Performance pay may have very different effects depending on the institutional 
environment in which it is implemented. In particular, the presence of unions and collective 
wage bargaining may change the conditions for and the design of performance-related pay 
schemes. Understanding the interplay between pay systems and union bargaining is thus 
crucial in order to understand the development of pay setting regimes, particularly in 
European labor markets where unions are prevalent, as well as to understand differences in 
levels and changes in within-group wage dispersion across economies. The theoretical 
literature on performance pay typically considers employer strategic behavior in the context 
of incomplete information about worker characteristics and/or behavior. Our theoretical 
model of performance pay includes a regime with union bargaining in order to derive 
hypotheses on the interaction effects between these two types of wage setting. Three features 
of unions are particularly important in this context.  
First, unions appropriate rent. Blanchflower and Bryson (2003) provide 
comprehensive evidence on the evolution of union-nonunion wage gaps in the UK and the 
US. This effect is usually thought of as a negative monopoly face of unionism (Freeman and 
Medoff, 1984). The existence of a union wage premium also implies, however, that workers 
may obtain part of the productivity gain caused by performance-based incentives. 
Furthermore, in the presence of rent, the wage policy of the firm is not necessarily constrained 
by outside options (i.e., a participation constraint), but rather limited by the bargaining power 
of the union. This feature of the employment relationship, that unions appropriate rent, has 
important implications for the design of the optimal pay scheme of the firm.  
Second, unions tend to compress wages. Wage dispersion is typically lower in 
unionized environments, see, e.g., Freeman and Medoff (1984) and Card et al. (2004) for 
evidence. Since performance pay may induce differences in effort and productivity, as well as 
pay, it is important to understand how the wage compressing mechanisms of unions operate.  
Below, we consider the wage compressing effects of a utilitarian union that represents the 
interests of risk-averse employees. Risk aversion implies that the union places more weight on 
low-paid workers than on high-paid workers, providing collective preferences that favor pay 
equality.   
Third, unions influence information flows. Freeman and Medoff (1984) argue that 
unions provide workers with a “collective voice” that improves the information flow within 
the firm. In particular, unions may voice grievances or preferences about workplace 
conditions that individual workers are reluctant to put forward. In the agency literature, 
however, the important information problem is lack of observability (or at least verifiability) 
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of effort. In the present paper, we argue that a union may operate as a monitoring device.1 It is 
easier (or less costly) for workers than for management to observe each others’ daily work. A 
higher level of trust among workers facilitates information sharing across employees. 
Consequently, the union may be able to enforce a given job standard, without substantial 
monitoring costs. The problem for the firm, then, is how to provide the union with incentives 
to keep a certain job standard. A group bonus may serve this purpose. The advantage of a 
bonus based on collective, rather than individual, outcomes is that risk is shared among 
workers. Below we analyze both individual and group-based performance pay schemes. It 
turns out that in the union bargaining case, the trade-off between individual and group-based 
pay schemes depends on the relative importance of risk sharing within the group versus the 
loss associated with enforcing a common job standard. 
 Our empirical contribution identifies the effect of introducing performance-related pay 
on the conditional within-establishment wage distribution, using a representative panel of two 
employer surveys from Norway, matched with the full set of employee records. The data 
allow us to use a comprehensive set of controls, both at the worker and at the firm level.  
Furthermore, we obtain identification by the use of establishment fixed effects. Controlling 
for establishment effects allows us to sweep out the permanent effect of worker sorting across 
firms as well as firm-specific heterogeneity, two issues that are of great concern in analyses of 
the relationship between pay and remuneration schemes.  
  There exists only a rather small literature analyzing the effects of performance-related 
pay on productivity and wage inequality. A few important results stem from case studies. For 
example, Lazear (2000) finds that the variance in output across individuals rose when the 
Safelite Glass Corporation shifted to piece rates. Among large scale analyses based on 
representative data sets, Belfield and Marsden (2003) find a positive association between the 
use of performance related pay and a crude measure of pay inequality. Lemieux et al. (2007) 
use US data, drawn from the PSID and the NLSY, to sort out the effect of performance pay on 
recent developments of the US wage structure. They find that growth in performance pay can 
explain a significant fraction of the increase in male wage inequality that occurred between 
the late 1970s and the early 1990s. Few studies link unionism and performance pay, and the 
empirical evidence from these studies appears inconclusive. While Brown (1990) and 
                                                 
1 See Pencavel (1977) for an early discussion of such a mechanism. According to Metcalf (2003), the Donovan 
Commission (1968) study of UK shop stewards emphasized the shop stewards’ role in communication, 
information, and discipline of workers. See also Vroman (1990), who uses such a mechanism to explain the 
cyclical behavior of the union-nonunion wage differential in an efficiency wage model.   
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Heywood et al. (1997) find less use of performance-related pay in unionized establishments, 
Booth and Frank (1999) and Booth and Francesconi (2000) uncover positive associations 
between union status and performance pay.  
In the next section we provide a theoretical analysis of the relationship between wage 
inequality and remuneration schemes under bargaining and unilateral decisions on part of the 
employer. In the following section, we detail our data. Section 4 presents the empirical 
analyses, and section 5 concludes. 
 
2. A Theoretical Model  
Our point of departure is a simple principal agent model in which performance pay is 
introduced in order to induce effort from the worker.2 To analyze the effects of payment 
schemes on wage dispersion within firms, we introduce individual heterogeneity along two 
dimensions. Workers differ in observable productivity (αi) as well as ‘efficiency,’ defined as 
the ability to transform effort (zi) into valuable output. Heterogeneous efficiency across 
workers is represented by pi which is an observable exogenously given parameter. The total 
value of a single worker’s output is given by 
(1)  ( ) ,i i i i iY p zα ε= + +   iε ~ ),0( 2σN  
where luck is measured by εi. The agency problem arises because it is hard to distinguish 
whether changes in output is caused by effort (zi) or luck (εi). Unless costly monitoring 
devices are implemented, the employer only observes the sum of the effort-induced 
contribution and the random component. Effort zi is chosen optimally by the worker, subject 
to constraints that vary across pay schemes. We assume that pi has a log-normal distribution 
across workers; 
(2) ipln ~ ( )22 ,2/ γγ−N  
where the normalization ensures that the expectation of the efficiency distribution across 
workers is unity;  
(3)  2( ) 1 , ( ) exp( ) 1i iE p V p γ= = − .  
The parameter γ captures the heterogeneity of effort efficiency across workers, and an 
increase in γ  represents a mean-preserving spread of the efficiency distribution. We assume 
                                                 
2 See Holmström and Milgrom (1987). For textbook expositions, see, e.g., Lazear (1995) and Cahuc and 
Zylberberg (2005). 
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that employers observe productivity (αi) and effort efficiency (pi) of each worker. Thus, wage 
contracts can be specified conditional on these characteristics.3  
The employer may observe individual effort (or equivalently, εi) by means of a costly 
monitoring scheme implemented through a set of rules or conditions related to the job, rather 
than to particular individuals, taking the form of a (common) standard for all workers. With 
monitoring, the employer is able to enforce a common effort standard ( z ) at a cost, M, where4  
(4) ( )M z n zλ= . 
The parameter n denotes the number of workers at the firm and λ ≥ 0 is the marginal cost of 
measuring (in a verifiable way) effort. A positive λ implies that it is more costly to monitor 
and verify workers’ effort the higher is the level of effort. For example, it may be inexpensive 
to verify a worker’s presence at work, but costly to verify the work intensity or concentration 
provided during this presence.  
We consider the following simple linear pay scheme: 
(5) ( )i i i i i iW b p zω ε= + +  
where ωi is a fixed component of the wage, and bi is the piece rate (or the worker’s share of 
the effort-induced productivity). We allow the share to vary across workers, but we will show 
shortly that it is optimal to have a common value for all. A fixed pay regime (FP) means that 
bi = 0, while a performance pay regime (PP) is characterized by 0 < bi ≤ 1.  
Workers are risk averse and care about both wages and effort. Individual utility is 
given by 
(6) ( )exp ( )i i iU a W C z= − − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  
where a>0  is a measure of risk aversion, and C(zi) is the cost of providing effort, zi. We 
assume convex effort costs, given by:  
(7)  2
1( )
2i i
C z cz=  
where c is a positive shift parameter of the marginal effort cost function. With performance 
pay, worker (ex post) utility depends on the normally distributed random component εi. 
                                                 
3 As we show below, this means that the firm will set the wage so that the expected utility of workers equals their 
reservation level, thus implying that sorting of workers across firms and pay regimes may be considered to be 
random. This is in contrast to a model where pay for performance is introduced in order to attract more efficient 
workers (see, e.g., Lazear, 1995).  
4 In principle, it may be optimal for the firm to let the effort requirement vary across workers. At the same time, 
monitoring technology will make it less costly to impose a common standard. We assume that the latter effect 
dominates. 
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Substituting in from equations (5) and (7), and taking the expectation of equation (6), the 
expected utility of an individual worker is given by 
(8) 2 2 2 2
exp( )
1 1
2 2
i i
i i i i i i i
EU a
b z cz b p aω σ
= − − Ψ
Ψ = + − −  
Note that 2 2 2[exp(- )] exp[ (1/ 2) ]i i i i iE ab p ap bε σ= −  since iε ~ ),0( 2σN  
   
 
2.1 The Nonunion Firm  
The firm maximizes expected profits (π), given by  
(9) 
1
[ (1 ) ( ) ] ,
n
i i i i i i
i
b p z nzπ α ε ω λ
=
= + − + − −∑  
and chooses the optimal remuneration scheme subject to a set of participation and incentive 
constraints. Participation requires that the expected utility of each worker matches her outside 
option, Xi, (i.e., exp( ) exp( )i i iEU a aX= − − Ψ ≥ − −  ). In general, the outside option is 
increasing in the observed productivity component, αi, but we do not need to specify the 
relationship in detail in order to proceed.  
The incentive constraints differ by pay regime. When the firm does not monitor effort 
(and sets 0z = ), the worker chooses effort to maximize expected utility, subject to the 
remuneration scheme. The optimal effort for the worker is given by zi=bi pi/c. (We return to 
the determination of bi below.) If the firm chooses a common effort standard ( 0)z > that is 
verified by the monitoring technology, a fixed pay contract will be preferred.5  
 
Case 1: Fixed Pay (FP)  
In the fixed pay regime (bi = 0), effort is determined by a common standard and the firm 
chooses a set of individual-specific fixed wages, ωi, to match the workers’ outside options. 
An optimal effort standard ( z ) maximizes profits subject to the participation (outside option) 
constraint. The optimal effort standard follows from equalizing marginal gains and marginal 
costs, which in the Appendix is shown to yield  
(10) 
(1 )z
c
λ−
= .   
                                                 
5 This follows from the fact that a positive bi requires some wage compensation for risk, while it does not 
contribute to effort, which in this case is determined by the common job standard.  
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The marginal revenue per worker, net of monitoring costs, from raising the job standard is 
equal to (1-λ). When the firm raises the job standard, it must also increase wages to 
compensate for higher effort. The average marginal cost per worker of increasing effort is 
simply given by cz . Note that the optimal effort standard is decreasing in both monitoring 
costs and average effort costs. The fixed pay is given by 
(11)  2
1 (1 )
2i i
W X
c
λ= + −  
With fixed pay, workers receive a wage that matches their outside option plus a compensation 
for effort which is common to all workers. Thus, the within-firm wage dispersion (as 
measured by the variance of W) reflects worker heterogeneity in outside options only: 
(12)  ( ) ( )Var W Var X= . 
Under fixed pay there is no impact of the luck component, simply because the firm bears all 
of the risk. 
 
Case 2: Performance Pay (PP) 
Instead of monitoring workers, the firm may choose bi and ωi to maximize profits, subject to 
the incentive and participation constraints. The optimal piece rate, as shown in the Appendix, 
is given by  
(13) 2
1
1i
b b
acσ
= =
+
. 
In line with the literature, the optimal piece rate is decreasing in risk aversion and the 
marginal cost of effort. It may seem surprising that b is independent of the efficiency of 
workers (pi). It is well known, however, that the optimal power of the incentive (b) arises 
from a trade off between risk compensation and the value of the effort induced. In our model 
the efficiency of a worker (pi) increases both the necessary compensation for risk and the 
value of increased effort proportionally, and thus it does not affect the trade-off between the 
two. The individual wage is given by  
(14) 
21
2i i i i i
W X bp bp
c
ε= + +  
where the deterministic part includes the outside option and a term which represents the share 
of the effort-induced output received by the worker, minus effort costs plus the compensation 
for risk since 
22
2 2 2 2( ) 1 1
2 2 2
i i
i i
bp bpc b p a bp
c c c
σ
⎛ ⎞
− + =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
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In contrast to the fixed pay regime, there is i) a risk to be compensated and ii) the worker 
receives a fraction of the luck component. Note also that pay is increasing in individual 
efficiency. More efficient workers provide more effort for which they receive a larger 
compensation. The stochastic component in (14) depends on the chosen piece rate and 
individual efficiency. If we let 2(1/ 2 ) i i i ic p p qε+ = , the wage dispersion within the 
nonunion firm under performance pay can then be written 
(15)  2( ) ( ) ( ) 2 cov( , )Var W Var X b Var q b X q= + +  
First, outside option variation is reflected in the wage structure. Second, efficiency 
heterogeneity implies that wages differ within firms because workers respond differently to 
incentives and do not provide the same effort. Finally, when the most efficient workers also 
have better outside options, the covariance term in (15) is positive and contributes to larger 
within firm wage inequality.  
Compared to the fixed pay regime, three differences from introducing performance 
pay stand out. First, wage differentials arise from effort heterogeneity. More efficient workers 
work harder and they are paid more. Second, wage differentials are reinforced under 
performance pay due to the positive correlation between efficiency and the outside option. 
Finally, variability in the unobserved luck component contributes to wage dispersion. The 
higher the share (b) of productivity that is captured by the worker, the larger is the wage 
dispersion within the firm. Wage inequality is greater under high-powered incentives.   
 
2.2 The Unionized Firm with Collective Bargaining 
The workers bargain collectively (by means of a union) with the firm over parameters of the 
pay structure and in the case of fixed pay, the effort standard. We consider Pareto optimal 
outcomes only, which would be the outcome if we assumed Nash bargaining. As long as the 
relative bargaining power remains the same over different bargaining issues covered by the 
collective agreement, the outcome is typically efficient. Thus, the outcome may be 
characterized by maximizing profits for a given level of utility on part of the union, and must 
satisfy the first order conditions of the Lagrangian (L) 
(16) ( ) ( )
1 1
(1 ) ( ) ( )
n n
i i i i i i i
i i
L b p z z exp a uα ε ω λ χ
= =
= + − + − − − − − Ψ −∑ ∑  
where χ  is the Lagrange multiplier and u defines the average given worker utility level.   
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Case 3: Union Fixed Pay (UFP) 
Like without unions, fixed pay contracts have b = 0 and common effort standard.  From the 
first order condition of (16), shown in the Appendix, the optimal effort standard is the same as 
without union presence, (1 ) /z cλ= − , unaffected by union power, reflected in (u ). The lack of 
influence of collective bargaining on the optimal common effort follows from the efficient 
bargaining assumption, in which the parties agree on an effort standard that maximizes the pie 
(revenue net of effort and monitoring costs). The surplus shares are then determined by 
negotiations over the fixed component of the pay contract, ωi.  The fixed-pay wage structure 
under collective bargaining is given by: 
(17)  
21( ) (1 )
2
( ) 0
iW E W c
Var W
λ= = Ψ + −
=
 
where ln( ) /u aΨ = − − . To maximize the collective utility of union members, wages are equated 
for all workers. The individual participation constraints are now replaced by a union utility 
constraint. Compared to the nonunion case, the union ensures that potential differences arising 
from outside option heterogeneity are equalized within the firm. The equalizing effect of the 
union arises from fact that, with equal effort, a risk-averse union will place more weight on 
low-pay groups. The most efficient way of satisfying the union utility constraint is thus to 
provide equal pay. Clearly, this result hinges on the assumption that iX iΨ > ∀ , which means 
that the union is strong enough to ensure that all workers receive a positive rent.6  
 
Case 4: Union Individualized Performance Pay (UPP) 
With individualized performance pay, there is no monitoring and individual workers choose 
effort optimally, zi=bipi/c. Individual worker utility is given by  
 ( )2 2 2exp( ), (1/ 2 ) 1i i i i i iEU a where c b p a cω σ= − Ψ Ψ = + − .  
The Lagrangian then takes the form  
(17)  ( ) ( )2
1 1
(1 )( / ) exp( )
n n
i i i i i i
i i
L b p b c a uα ω μ
= =
= + − − − − − Ψ −∑ ∑  
which is maximized with respect to bi and ωi (i=1,..n). The first order conditions imply that 
the optimal piece rate is the same for all workers and equal to that of the nonunion case, see 
                                                 
6 Alternatively, one might consider a situation where the binding constraint is the outside options of the highest 
paid workers, i.e., where low-paid workers rely on coordinated action, while the most productive workers are 
paid according to their market value. In this case a kinked wage schedule in Xi, with wage compression in all but 
the upper part of the distribution, would result.  
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Appendix. Again, the average productivity level is unaffected by the bargaining power of the 
two parties, just as in the fixed pay regime, because of the efficient bargaining assumption. 
The wage structure is given by   
 (18) 
2
2
1
2
( ) ( )
i i i i iW bp bp bqc
Var W b Var q
ε= Ψ + + == Ψ +
=
 
The wage has two components that are common to all workers in the firm, determined by the 
bargaining power of the union and the compensation for risk. More efficient workers provide 
greater effort and are therefore compensated so as to equalize marginal utility across workers.  
Finally, the wage captures part of the luck component.  
Wage dispersion is lower than in the nonunion case with performance pay, because 
variation in the outside option does not spill over to wage differentials within the firm. 
Moreover, because outside options are non-binding, there is no positive association between 
effort compensation and wage-driving outside factors.   
 
Case 5: Group Performance Pay (GPP) 
As discussed in the introduction, one possible role of unions may be to provide a form of self-
monitoring mechanism. We assume that the union is willing to monitor effort only if the 
standard is the same for all workers, iz z= , and provided that the reward system leaves 
workers with the same expected utility, Ψ=Ψ ~i . We justify these assumptions on the grounds 
that the unions cannot be expected to treat its members differently, particularly when 
cooperation among workers is required. Since the verification problem facing the employer is 
the same as before, the effort standard that the union is willing to enforce has to be 
collectively optimal for the workers. In order to induce the union to enforce a higher level of 
effort, the employer may use a group piece rate (denoted β to distinguish the notation from the 
individual piece rate, b).7 With a group bonus, the pay is the sum of a fixed wage and the 
share of the common effort as well as the average luck;  ( )i iW zω β ε= + + .  
(Note that 
1
1 n
i
i
p z z
n
=
=∑  and 
1
1 n
i i
i
p
n
ε
=
∑ is labeled ε .) 
 
Expected utility is a function of  
                                                 
7 Note that the group bonus could have been an option in the nonunion case as well. However, in the absence of 
union monitoring, the free rider problem implies less effort by each individual with group rates than with 
individual piece rates.  
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2
2 21
2 2i i
zz ac
c n
ω β β σΨ = + − − . 
 The optimal effort standard, according to union preferences, is determined by the condition 
(19) ( ) 0
i
i
a
ae ae cz
z
β
− Ψ
− Ψ∂ −
= − =
∂
∑ ∑  
implying that 
(20)  /z cβ=  , when Ψ=Ψ ~i .  
Note that the optimal effort standard is independent of the fixed wage component, iω . This 
result follows from mechanisms similar to those of the traditional performance pay model. It 
enables the parties to agree on a bonus rate which elicits effort, while the fixed component can 
be used to smooth utility across workers. The common effort is increasing in the bonus 
parameter and decreasing in the marginal cost of effort, as with the traditional performance 
pay schemes.  
With a group bonus, the bargaining problem maximizes the Lagrangian 
(21) 
2
1
1 exp( )
n
i i
i i i
i
p pL a u
c c n
β β
α ω μ
=
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞
= ∑ + − − − ∑− − Ψ −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠  
and it follows from the first order conditions shown in Appendix that the optimal group bonus 
rate is  
(22) 2
1
1 /ac n
β
σ
=
+
 
The group rate is increasing in n, providing higher powered incentives in the group bonus 
case than in the case with individualized performance pay. This result is a reflection of the 
risk pooling across union members. The wage structure is given by:  
(23) 
1( ) ( ) ( )
2
( ) 0
i iW z E W c
Var W
ω β ε β ε= + + = = Ψ + +
=
  
With a union bargaining group bonus, individual productivity as well as outside option 
heterogeneity, are leveled. The outside options are assumed to be non-binding and all workers 
supply a common effort standard. Finally, the average luck shock is the basis for bonuses 
which are equal for all workers. Thus, all workers are paid the same.  
 
 14
2.3 Summary of Wage Inequality across Regimes  
Wages may differ within firms because of variation in outside options (partly due to 
observable productivity), heterogeneity in effort efficiency, and luck. Individual performance 
pay increases the within-firm wage dispersion since individual output luck affects wages. 
Incentives at the individual worker level also creates wage differentials under performance 
pay because more efficient workers are compensated for higher effort. In a nonunion 
environment, different outside options will generate wage dispersions across workers in the 
same firm, even in a fixed pay regime. With performance pay, the effort compensation is 
positively correlated with outside options, contributing to additional wage variability 
compared to fixed pay. Thus, when the firm has the power to unilaterally set wages, within 
firm dispersion is higher with performance pay.  
A union with power to deliver rents to its members contributes to more compressed 
wages, appearing in our model as an equalization of expected utility across individual 
workers. With individualized performance pay, union bargaining will also cut the association 
between efficiency and the outside option as drivers of wages. Thus, our framework 
unambiguously predicts that (i) performance pay will reduce wage dispersion under union 
bargaining, but (ii) the impact of introducing performance pay is smaller in the union case 
than in the nonunion case. Finally, wage dispersion within firms with group-based 
performance pay systems (where an effort standard is monitored by the union) is likely to be 
similar to that found under fixed-pay collective bargaining. 
 
2.4 Profits across Regimes 
When the pay components are set unilaterally by the firm, as in the nonunion (subscript nu) 
case, expected profits are equal to   
(24) 
2
2
exp( ) 1
2 1
PP
nu X c ac
γ
π α
σ
= − +
+
 
and 
(25)  
2(1 )
2
FP
nu X c
λ
π α
−
= − +  
under performance and fixed pay, respectively. Thus, profits are proportional to average 
output arising from worker effort. In the fixed pay case, profits are net of monitoring costs 
What determines the preferred regime for the firm? First, if monitoring costs are sufficiently 
large, profits are higher with performance pay. Second, if effort efficiency becomes more 
dispersed, the average effort is raised (even if the optimal share, b, is independent of γ). Thus, 
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with greater worker heterogeneity, performance pay is more likely to be preferred by the firm. 
Finally, factors that reduce the optimal bonus share (b), such as risk aversion (a) and 
dispersion of random shocks (σ2), also make performance pay less attractive because average 
effort and thereby productivity is reduced.  
With union presence and efficient bargaining, the ranking of profits is the same (for a 
given level of union utility), since  
(26) 
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Even in the presence of unions, individual performance pay is likely to be preferred over fixed 
pay if monitoring costs are sufficiently large, workers differ in terms of efficiency, risk 
aversion is low, and if individual productivity is not too heavily influenced by random events.  
With a group-based bonus, expected profits are again proportional to average 
productivity which is equal to the common output standard monitored by the union;   
(28) 2
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Profits are highest with group-based performance pay if and only if average effort is higher 
than in the other regimes. Compared to fixed pay, a group-based bonus is likely to be more 
profitable if monitoring costs are large, risk aversion is low, and if individual productivity is 
not too heavily influenced by luck. Efficiency dispersion (γ) has no impact in a group-based 
bonus regime. Consequently, a more heterogeneous workforce in terms of effort efficiency 
will raise profits under individual performance pay and make group-based bonuses relatively 
less attractive.  
 
2.5 The Impact of Performance Pay: Empirical Identification 
Our theoretical model clearly suggests that the firm’s choice of pay system is endogenous. 
Firms self-select into pay regimes partly on the basis of worker and firm characteristics which 
themselves affect within-firm wage dispersion. For example, the optimal pay system depends 
on the monitoring technology available to the firm. Furthermore, firms with heterogeneity in 
worker efficiency will tend to implement individual performance pay. This means that firm-
specific heterogeneity can be a predictor of performance pay rather than a result of it. A 
careful assessment of the impact of performance pay on wage variability thus requires linked 
employer-employee data. It obviously also requires a strategy for identification, since cross-
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sectional comparisons of firms or individuals may confound the heterogeneity of firms and 
workers with the effects of performance pay. 
 Another complexity is that workers may self-select into firms with different pay 
schemes. In our model, the firm is able to compensate workers with different efficiencies 
exactly through the fixed component of the wage. This observation may justify the empirical 
assumption of random sorting of workers across firms. In practice, however, this may be 
problematic, as individualized compensation may be less than perfect, inducing self-selection 
of more efficient workers into firms with performance-based pay systems (see, e.g., the 
discussion in Lazear, 1995).   
 In our empirical analyses, we rely on fixed-effects estimators for identification. 
Because we have panel data of both firms and workers, we are able to estimate the effect of 
introducing performance-related pay from observing changes in wage dispersion in firms that 
switch pay regime, both with and without restricting the analysis to workers who stay with the 
firm. In this way we control for time invariant heterogeneity across firms, and at the same 
time we are able to adjust for the impact of self-selection of workers.  
 Ideally, we would like to model the switching across pay regimes, and instrument for 
the performance pay indicator. According to our model, plausible instruments could come 
from such factors as monitoring technology, idiosyncratic risk, risk aversion, or effort 
heterogeneity. However, we have not been able to find convincing exclusion restrictions, and 
thus rely on the fixed-effects methodology. One way to think about the introduction of 
performance pay schemes, then, is that the switchers represent the marginal firms who happen 
to change their pay practice during our observational window, for instance as a result of 
influences such as a change in the management group, labor relations, or even developments 
in the management literature. In contrast, a cross-sectional analysis would look across the 
total population of firms with and without performance pay schemes, comparing firms with 
different incentives for their particular pay regime. 
 
3. Data Sources, Samples, and Variable Construction  
The core of our data material consists of the Norwegian Flexibility Survey 1997 and the 2003 
Norwegian Work and Establishment Survey. Both surveys were carried out as computer 
assisted telephone interviews with either the manager or the chief personnel officer of the 
establishment. In both surveys, random, but stratified (with respect to establishment size, age, 
and sector), samples were drawn from the population of Norwegian establishments with more 
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than 10 employees. Questions concerning employees typically related to the "main 
occupational group" at the establishment. In addition, the survey data were matched with 
detailed data about the establishment and each of its employees taken from various 
administrative registers. The register data are annual and cover the period 1995-2003. 
The response rates of the surveys were 76 percent in 1997 and 77 percent in 2003. In 
the present study, we focus on private sector establishments. Employees working fewer than 
30 hours per week are excluded from the analyses, as are firms with less than ten individual 
observations in the full-time worker data set (as the within firm differentials are poorly 
defined in these firms). This leaves us with 2,406 observations of 1,751 establishments with 
valid data in 1997 or 2003. Of these, 655 establishments are represented in both surveys.  
 
Performance-related Pay  
Both establishment surveys contained questions about performance-related pay. 
Unfortunately, these questions were not identical in the two surveys. In 1997, respondents 
were asked whether or not “the main occupational group receives any pay through incentive 
pay systems, bonuses, or profit sharing?” In 2003, the survey instrument instead included 
separate questions about six different forms of performance-related pay; (a) Individual and 
group piece rates, (b) Commissions, (c) Group bonuses, (d) Profit sharing, (e) Individual 
bonuses, and (f) Individual performance assessments.  
Respondents were also asked to estimate the share of total wages that were associated 
with each type of performance pay. It seems reasonable to assume that managers who in 2003 
answered affirmative on the use of at least one the five former pay types (a)-(e) would have 
answered "yes" to the 1997 question. It is not obvious, however, how establishments with 
type (f) "individual performance assessments," would have interpreted the 1997 question. In 
addition, it is not clear whether the answers refer to permanent or variable elements of 
compensation. In the empirical analyses, we classify the wage policy at the firm as 
performance-related pay in 2003 if the manager answered "yes" on at least one of the types 
(a)-(f). If "yes" on (f) only, its share of total wages must be at least 3 percent.8 Performance-
related pay is found in about half of the firms, see Table 1.  
 
 
                                                 
8 The core results in this paper are, however, not sensitive to whether we instead use a “strict” definition of 
performance pay in 2003, including firms that ticked one of (a)-(e) only, or a “wide” definition also including all 
firms with (f), individual performance assessments.  
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Wage Differentials 
Information about the firm-level wage structure is taken from administrative register data. 
Our individual wage measure is constructed by dividing the firm’s report of total wages paid 
to each individual worker through the year, by the number of days of the employment 
relationship. This daily wage rate is then adjusted by means of a regression of individual log 
wages on educational attainment (seven levels); age and its square; interactions between each 
education level and the age polynomial; immigrant status; union membership; gender and 
interactions between gender and all other characteristics; an indicator variable for year of 
observation; interactions between the year variable and all other regressors as well as 
establishment-year fixed effects. This first-step regression provides 292,690 log wage 
residuals. From the distribution of log wage residuals of individual workers, we compute the 
10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles of the residual log wage distribution within each establishment. 
Average wages are compared across establishments by means of the set of year-specific fixed 
effects.  
 As Table 1 shows, the average 90-10 log wage differential in the sample is .697 and it 
drops to .607 after controlling for individual observed characteristics of the workforce. As 
expected, the wage differentials are larger in firms with performance related pay. The wage 
differentials in the balanced panel are similar to what is observed in the combined cross 
sections.  
 
Union Density and Control Variables 
Union density is the proportion of workers at the establishment who are members of a union. 
We collect this information from the manager surveys. If not available in the survey data, we 
computed the union density from data on individual payments of union membership dues 
identified through registers and aggregated to the establishment level. Union density reflects 
the ability of the workers to coordinate industrial actions, see, e.g., Barth et al. (2001), and to 
promote collective interests with respect to both the level and dispersion of wages. Bargaining 
structure and the presence of collective agreements are typically correlated with union 
membership. The sample average union density is close to 60 percent, and membership is 
lower in firms with performance related pay. Again, the balanced sample appears to be fairly 
representative.  
We include firm size and age as well as industry affiliation (12 major industries) 
among the firm-level control variables. From the individual data, we calculate the fraction of 
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female workers and the skill composition (i.e., the fractions of workers with low and high 
educational attainment) at the firm level.  
Our sample is restricted to the private sector.  Due to reorganization of former 
government monopolies, establishments within postal services and the national 
telecommunications company (Telenor) were classified as belonging to the public sector in 
1997 and to the private sector in 2003. 
 
4. Empirical Results  
This section reports our empirical estimates of how performance-related pay systems affect 
wage inequality within firms, but we first look at pay differentials between firms.  
 
4.1 Performance Pay Raises the Mean Wage, but not by much 
From the theoretical model, we expect firms with performance related pay to have higher 
wages. The effect arises from the need to compensate workers for the exposure to risk. Note 
that we do not necessarily expect productivity to be higher with performance-related pay. The 
reason is that, when firms can monitor worker effort at low costs, they will fix standards at a 
higher level of effort than the average effort level induced by the performance-pay scheme. 
Moreover, imperfect differentiation with respect to the outside option creates a sorting 
incentive (see, e.g., Lazear, 1995), in such a way that more productive workers tend to sort 
into firms with performance pay. This sorting would induce a positive correlation between 
performance pay and wages, even though it was not a causal relation. In order to sweep out 
the effect of such sorting, it is necessary to control carefully for individual characteristics.  
Table 2 shows a positive effect of performance-pay schemes on the firm average wage 
level. Workers in firms with performance pay have a pay advantage of 9 percent over workers 
in firms without performance-related pay, see column (1). The wage premium reflects in part 
better observed individual characteristics of workers in performance-pay firms; when we 
account for differences in education, age, and other individual characteristics, the estimated 
pay advantage drops to 6.6 percent (col. 2). When we also account for differences in observed 
characteristics of firms, such as degree of unionization, firm size, employee composition, and 
industry, the pay advantage falls even further—to 2.5 percent (col. 3). When we take 
advantage of the panel dimension of the data and estimate the wage effect of performance-pay 
schemes including firm fixed effects, the estimate drops even more to 1.8 percent (col. 5). 
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Note that the panel estimates without fixed effects (col. 4) are very similar to those for the full 
sample, suggesting that the balanced panel is fairly representative.  
A possible concern is that these estimates are influenced by selective mobility among 
workers. For example, high-performing workers may be attracted to firms with performance-
pay schemes, in which case the observed pay advantage of performance-pay firms might 
reflect sorting of workers rather than a true effect of the pay scheme. A simple test is to re-
estimate the model in the sub-sample of employees that worked at the same establishment 
both in 1997 and 2003, see cols. (6) and (7). Results based on the restricted sample reveal 
slightly larger effects of performance pay than those from the overall sample. Of particular 
interest is the estimated coefficient reported in column (7), which is identified from 
differential wage growth between employees that experienced the introduction (or 
elimination) of performance-related pay schemes during the sample period and employees 
that did not. The estimated effect of performance pay based on this sample is 2.8 percent.9 
The lower longitudinal estimates of the performance-pay effect may reflect correlation 
between performance pay and unobserved firm characteristics with positive wage effects, 
such as superior organization or management. However, any attenuation bias arising from 
measurement error in the performance-pay variable will be amplified by the fixed effect 
specification. Overall, our preferred estimate of the firm wage effect is 2.8 percent. 
In Table 3, we examine whether union power and bargaining regime influence the 
effect of performance pay on firm-level wages. Using union density to summarize the wage 
setting environment, column (1) suggests that such an interaction does exist. The estimated 
effect of performance pay in non-unionized firms (i.e., firms with a zero union density) is a 
5.4 percent boost in the average wage, while the average wage is largely unaffected by 
performance pay in fully unionized firms (i.e., 0.6 percent; .054-.048). The empirical evidence 
on wage differentials between firms in Table 3 is, however, not very strong. When we 
consider the panel sample, introduce firm fixed effects, or when the sample is restricted to 
employees at the same workplace both years, the results fail to uncover a significant union 
interaction on the performance-pay effect on the average firm wage. Overall, Tables 2 and 3 
reveal that firms with performance-related pay have slightly higher wages than those with 
fixed-pay schemes only.   
                                                 
9 The restricted sample consists of 79,068 individuals for whom we observe wage payments from the same 
employer in both survey years. Among these employees, 24.6 percent experienced the introduction and 5.1 
percent the elimination of performance pay during the sample period. When we allow for asymmetric impacts of 
introducing and eliminating performance pay, the estimated coefficient of “Add performance pay” is .029 
(se=.012) and the coefficient of “Drop performance pay” is  -.027 (se=.018). 
 21
 
4.2 Performance Pay Raises Within-firm Wage Inequality, but less so in Unionized Firms  
Table 4 displays the results from regressions of within-firm wage inequality on firm 
characteristics, including whether or not the firm has a performance-pay scheme. In column 
(1) the dependent variable is the 90th -10th percentile differential in the observed log wage of 
employees at the establishment, while in columns (2)-(6) the differential is based on the log 
wage residual.  As Table 4 shows, wage dispersion is greater in firms with performance pay; 
the 90-10 differential is .077 log point higher in performance-pay firms according to the 
estimate in column (1). Some of that is attributable to variation in worker and firm 
characteristics. When we account for worker characteristics, the coefficient of the 
performance-pay indicator drops to .056 (col. 2), and when we add firm characteristics the 
association between performance pay and within-firm dispersion is reduced to about half of 
that in observed wages (col. 3). Yet, the association remains statistically significant.  
Our theory predicts that performance pay has a modest impact on wage dispersion in 
firms with union bargaining. When we interact performance pay and union density, the effect 
seems modest in firms with high union membership although the interaction term is only 
significant at the 10 percent level (see column 4). In firms without union presence, however, 
performance pay is associated with considerably higher wage dispersion.  
 In the balanced panel, we find even stronger empirical support for the effect of 
performance related pay on within-firm wage inequality (col. 5). In firms without unions (in 
terms of membership), performance-related pay has a significant and positive effect on wage 
differentials. In the opposite end with full membership, wage differentials are unaffected by 
the introduction of performance related pay. One might suspect that these results are driven 
by unobserved firm characteristics correlated with pay system and organization. However, 
introducing firm fixed effects in the balanced panel sample has only a negligible impact on 
coefficient estimates of the performance-pay variables, suggesting that unobserved, time-
invariant heterogeneity is not the driving force behind these empirical patterns.  
 Between 1997 and 2003, the sample average of the dependent variable—the within-
firm 90-10 log wage differential conditional on observed worker characteristics—rose by 
0.069 log point (not reported in tables). During the same period, there was a 12.6 percentage 
point increase in firms’ use of performance pay (Barth et al., 2007).10 According to the 
estimates in Table 4, performance pay raises the within-firm 90-10 differential by 0.041 log 
                                                 
10 This figure agrees with the observed increase in use of bonuses as identified by official wage statistics (Lunde 
and Grini, 2007).  
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points. The implication is that the expansion of performance-based pay systems can explain 
about 7.5 percent of the observed growth in within-firm wage inequality.11 Although 
performance pay schemes lead to greater within-firm wage dispersion, only a small share of 
the increase in wage inequality over the sample period can be attributed to more widespread 
use of performance pay.   
 
4.3 Performance Pay Affects Wages more in the Top of the Within-firm Wage 
Distribution—and more so in Nonunion Firms than in Union Firms 
Further inspections into the impact of performance pay across the wage distribution are 
provided in Tables 5 and 6. First, Table 5 reveals that the effects are equally strong at the top 
(90-50) and at the bottom (50-10) of the distribution. Moreover, in unionized firms, 
introduction of performance-related pay does not seem to affect the wage structure at all, as 
the coefficient of the interaction term between union density and performance pay takes the 
opposite sign and is of similar magnitude to the main effect listed in the top row of the table. 
Cols. (3) and (6) also reveal that time-invariant firm heterogeneity does not explain this 
pattern as the coefficient estimates of the performance pay variables from the firm-fixed 
effects models are basically identical to those from models without fixed effects. 
In table 6, we examine the impact of performance pay at various percentiles of the 
within-firm residual wage distribution.12 Columns (1)-(3) present analyses of determinants of 
the 90th percentile wage residual within the firm. Results confirm that the impact of 
performance-related pay at the top of the wage distribution depends on the degree of 
unionization within the firm. In nonunion firms the estimated effect is in the range of five to 
six percent depending on whether or not the regression includes firm fixed effects. 
Importantly, the effect on top-level wages declines with the unionization rate of the firm. In 
firms where all workers are union members, the estimate of the performance-pay effect on the 
90th percentile wage is close to zero and statistically insignificant. The cross-sectional 
estimates suggest a significant and negative main effect of union density, supporting the idea 
that union power compress wages at the top.  
 The effects on wages in the lower end of the within-firm wage distribution are shown 
in columns (4)-(6).  Although estimated with larger standard errors, a striking pattern is that 
signs of coefficients from the 10th percentile regressions are opposite those found for the top 
                                                 
11 Based on the average effect in column (3), the calculation is 0.041*(0.126/0.069) = 0.075.  
12 To save space, we only present results based on the balanced panel. Analyses based on the full sample of firms 
yielded very similar results and are available upon request. 
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of the wage distribution. Indeed, the estimated coefficients suggest that, in nonunion firms, 
performance pay has a negative effect on the bottom wages in the firm. Results also show a 
positive interaction with degree of unionization which is clearly significant in the balanced 
sample, even with establishment fixed effect. Again, the main effect of higher unionization is 
to raise the level for the lowest paid, although the evidence is less clear when identified by 
means of changes in union density (i.e. with fixed effects). As far as the left tail of the within 
firm wage distribution is concerned, unions seem to raise the wage of those with lowest pay 
and also prevent any negative effect that performance-pay schemes may have on for these 
workers.    
 
4.4 Why Is the Effect of Performance Pay lower in Unionized Firms?   
Our theoretical model predicts that the design of a performance-related pay scheme differs 
according to union presence. Utilitarian unions have preferences for equality and can assist 
the firm in monitoring (and sanctioning lack of) individual effort to sustain group-based 
incentives. Our data offer a simple distinction between individual (e.g., individual bonuses 
based on performance) and group-based (e.g., group bonus) performance pay.  Unfortunately, 
this information is not available from the 1997 survey, but the 2003 survey contained detailed 
questions on various pay components for the major occupational group at the establishment. 
Here, we define group-based schemes as group bonuses, while other forms of performance 
pay are classified as individual performance pay. 13 
In Table 7, columns (1) and (2), we report results pertaining to firms’ introduction of 
performance-pay schemes over the sample period. Column (1) addresses the probability of 
having (any kind of) performance pay in 2003 among firms which did not have it six years 
earlier. Firms with strong unions are less likely to introduce performance pay; the coefficient 
on union density is significantly negative and shows that, among firms without performance 
pay in 1997, fully unionized firms were 21 percentage points less likely to adopt a 
performance pay schedule over the sample period compared to nonunion firms. Moreover, 
among those firms that introduced performance pay, group-based schemes were more likely 
in the presence of strong unions. In column (2), the coefficient on union density indicates that, 
in the event of an introduction of a performance pay system, fully unionized firms were 24 
percentage points more likely to adopt a group-based bonuses compared to firms without 
union membership,.  
                                                 
13 The results are very similar if we include profit sharing as a group-based scheme.  
 24
 
Turning next to within-firm wage dispersion, columns (3) and (4) display the 
coefficient estimates from equations where the 90-10 residual wage differential is regressed 
on performance pay and the interaction with group-based systems as well as other firm 
characteristics. According to the coefficient estimates, individualized performance pay raises 
within-firm wage inequality by about 7 percent, while a group-based system raises inequality 
by 3 percent. Importantly, the estimated effect of group-based systems is significantly lower 
than that of individualized pay.  
Column (5) represents the quasi-fixed effects model, where the within-firm change in 
the wage differential from 1997 to 2003 is estimated as a function of the introduction of 
performance pay, an interaction between introduction and group-based schemes, as well as 
change in other time-varying firm characteristics. Firms that introduced individualized 
performance pay experienced a .102 log point increase in wage differentials. The point 
estimates suggest a considerably more moderate rise in wage differentials within firms that 
introduced a group-based system, although the interaction effect is only significant at the 10 
percent level. Taken together, the evidence in Table 7 shows that the bulk of the effect of 
performance pay on within-firm wage dispersion stems from individualized pay systems. 
Group-based bonuses for the main occupational group has less, if any, impact on wage 
variability within the firm. 
 
5. Conclusions   
Theory predicts that wage differentials between and within firms are linked to the choice of 
pay system. First, we do not necessarily expect to find higher productivity in firms with 
performance-related pay. As frequently stated in the literature, monitoring firms with fixed 
pay systems are likely to implement effort standards higher than the ones chosen by workers 
in performance-pay firms. Second, theory suggests that the choice of pay system (i.e., pay for 
performance or fixed pay) is independent of the bargaining power of the union. Third, the 
introduction of individual performance-related pay is likely to have a much stronger impact 
on wage inequality in nonunion firms than in firms where union influence is strong. Fourth, 
wage dispersion in firms with group-based bonuses is likely to be similar to that in firms with 
fixed pay.   
According to our theory, the main effects of performance pay on within-firm wage 
dispersion arise from two sources: The first effect stems from a change in the distribution of 
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effort within the firm. In a fixed-pay regime with a common effort standard, wages only vary 
according to observed productivity and outside options. With performance pay, effort and 
output of the most efficient workers is enhanced, and consequently so is their pay in order to 
compensate higher effort cost and risk. As the more efficient workers typically have better 
outside options, the introduction of performance pay also leads to an increase in wages of 
workers with high pay in the first place. The second effect relates to the distribution of the 
luck component of the value of output which in the case of individual performance pay is 
partly passed on to the workers.  
 In a union bargaining setting, similar mechanisms operate, but they are modified in 
important ways. First, the union wage compression breaks the link between the distribution of 
outside options and the internal distribution of wages under performance pay. If a firm 
introduces individual performance pay, the more efficient workers obtain higher pay, but the 
wage inequality is not amplified in a union setting since all are equally paid (above their 
outside option).  Secondly, in the union setting, group-performance pay is more likely because 
the union may act as a monitoring device for the firm, and thus provide a partial solution to 
the underlying agency problem. Unions may contribute to the solution of the asymmetric 
information problem as they possess the ability to use collective action to sustain a high effort 
level and back their claim on their share of the productivity gain. Theory, then, suggests that 
group-based performance pay schemes have minor effects on the wage distribution since both 
effort and total compensation is more evenly distributed. Finally, with group bonuses, the 
stochastic output component has no effect on the within-firm wage distribution, since the risk 
is pooled across workers.  
Empirically, we do find higher wage levels in firms with performance related pay. 
However, after controlling for individual worker and firm characteristics, the wage premium 
of performance pay firms drops to about 2 percent. We are not ready to take this as evidence 
of productivity effects of pay for performance, simply because it may well be compensation 
for higher risk. Performance pay is less prevalent in highly unionized firms. This observation 
seems to be at odds with our predictions, since according to the model, bargaining strength 
does not affect the motivation to deviate from fixed pay. However, our conjecture is that some 
of the union’s opposition is directed more against payment schemes that leave a lot of 
discretion in the hands of management. In this case, our bargaining model does not apply 
straightforwardly, as bargaining power is unevenly distributed across the various elements of 
the contract, and the parties may generally end up with Pareto-inferior outcomes. Another 
potentially important reason why performance pay schemes are less prevalent in unionized 
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environments is that union bargaining in itself has similar qualities to that of a group bonus, 
since unions through bargaining appropriate a share of the rents associated with higher 
performance. In this sense, union bargaining mimics a group-based pay scheme, and may 
provide similar incentives for self-monitoring and higher effort. 
The observed impact of performance pay on within-firm wage dispersion is consistent 
with our theoretical predictions. Performance-related pay raises the within-establishment 
wage dispersion. Furthermore, the increase in wage dispersion is significantly reduced by 
union presence in the establishment. These results remain after controlling for composition of 
workers and establishment fixed effects.  
The impact of performance pay on wage dispersion is significantly lower with group-
based pay schemes than with individualized performance-based pay schemes. Firms that 
introduce performance pay schemes are more likely to choose group-based pay if there is a 
strong union present. This evidence is consistent with our model, based on the assumption 
that the union may serve as a self-monitoring device and thus contributes to solve the free-
rider problem associated with group-based pay.  
There appears to be an underlying trend in the direction of higher within-firm wage 
inequality in our data, even after controlling for the use and introduction of performance pay. 
All in all, we conclude that even though pay for performance is on the rise and does 
contribute to within-firm wage inequality, the introduction of such types of payment schemes 
is unlikely to be a major contributor to the increase in the wage dispersion in the highly 
unionized European labor markets. 
 
 
References  
 
Autor, David H., Lawrence F. Katz, and Melissa S. Kearney (2005), ”Trends in U.S. Wage 
Inequality: Re-Assessing the Revisionists” Discussion Paper Number 2095, Harvard 
Institute of Economic Research, Cambridge: Harvard University. 
 
Barth, Erling, Bernt Bratsberg, Torbjørn Hægeland, and Oddbjørn Raaum (2006), “Who Pays 
for Performance?” IZA DP 2142, forthcoming International Journal of Manpower. 
 
Barth, Erling, and Claudio Lucifora (2006) “Wage Dispersion, Markets and Institutions, The 
Effects of the Boom in Education on the Wage Structure” IZA Discussion Paper No. 
2181.  
 
Barth, E. , Naylor, R. and O. Raaum (2001), Union Wage Effects: Does Membership Matter?, 
 Manchester School Vol. 68 (3) 2001, 259-275.  
 
 27
Belfield, R., and D. Marsden (2003), “Performance pay, monitoring environments, and 
establishment performance,” International Journal of Manpower, vol. 24(4): 452-471. 
 
Blanchflower, D. and Bryson, A. (2003) ‘Changes over time in union relative wage effects in 
the UK and the US Revisited’, chapter 7 in International Handbook of Trade Unions, 
John T. Addison and Claus Schnabel (eds.), Edward Elgar. 
 
Booth, Alison, and Jeff Frank (1999), “Earnings, Productivity, and Performance-Related 
Pay,” Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 17(3): 447-463.  
 
Booth, Alison L., and Marco Francesconi, (2000), "Collectivism versus Individualism: 
Performance-related Pay and Union Coverage for Non-standard Workers in Britain," 
ILR working papers 061, Institute for Labour Research. 
 
Brown, Charles (1990), “Firm’s Choice of Method of Pay,” Industrial and Labor Relations 
Review, Vol. 43(3): 165S-182S. 
 
Brown, Michelle, and John S. Heywood (2002), Paying for Performance: An international 
comparison. Armonk NY: M.E. Sharpe.  
 
Cahuc, Pierre and André Zylberberg (2004) Labor Economics, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT 
Press.  
 
Card, David, Thomas Lemieux, and W. Craig Riddell (2004), “Unions and Wage Inequality,” 
Journal of Labor Research 25:4 (Fall). 
 
DiNardo, John, Nicole M. Fortin, and Thomas Lemieux (1996), ”Labor Market Institutions 
and the Distribution of Wages 1973-1992, A Semiparametric Approach,” 
Econometrica 64(5):1001-1044. 
 
Foss, Nicolai J., and Keld Laursen (2005), “Performance pay, delegation and multitasking 
under uncertainty and innovativeness: An empirical investigation,” Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 58: 246-276.  
 
Freeman, Richard B, and James Medoff. What Do Unions Do? New York: Basic Books, 
 1984. 
 
Heywood, John, W.S. Siebert, and X. Wei (1997), “Payment by Results Systems: British 
Evidence,” British Journal of Industrial Relations, 35: 1-22.  
 
Holmström, Bengt, and Paul Milgrom (1987), “Aggregation and linearity in the provision of 
intertemporal incentives,” Econometrica 55(2): 303-328. 
 
Kahn, Lawrence (2000), "Wage Inequality, Collective Bargaining and Relative Employment  
1985-94: Evidence from 15 OECD Countries," The Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 82, No. 4. 
 
Kersley, B, C. Alpin, J. Forth, A. Bryson, H. Bewley, G Dix, and S Oxenbridge (2006), Inside 
the Workplace: Findings from the 2004 Workplace Employment Relations Survey, 
London and New York: Routledge. 
 28
 
Lazear, Edward P. (1995), Personnel Economics, MIT Press.  
 
Lazear, Edward P. (2000), “The Use of Performance Measures in Incentive Contracting,” 
American Economic Review, Vol. 90(2): 415-420. 
 
Lazear, Edward P. (2002), “Performance Pay and Productivity,” American Economic Review, 
Vol. 90(5):1346-1361. 
 
Lemieux, Thomas, Macleod, W. Bentley and Daniel Parent (2007), Performance pay and 
Wage Inequality, NBER Working Paper 13128. 
 
Lunde, H. and K.,H.,Grini (2007), ”Bonus – hvor mye og til hvem?” SSB Rapport 2007/18.  
 
Metcalf, David (2003), “Unions and productivity, financial performance and investment: 
International evidence.” In International handbook of trade unions. Edited by 
Addison, J.; Schnabel, C. Edward Elgar, 2003, pp. 118-171.  
 
Pencavel, J. (1977), "The Distributional and Efficiency Effects of Trade Unions in Britain",  
British Journal of Industrial Relations, 15 (2), July 1977, 137-56. 
 
Vroman, Susan (1990), “The Union-Nonunion Wage Differential and Monitoring Costs,” 
Economics Letters 32, 405-409.  
 29
Table 1: Firm Characteristics 
 
     
 Full sample  Balanced panel 
  
 
All 
firms 
Firms 
without 
perform- 
ance pay 
 
Firms with 
perform- 
ance pay 
 
 
All 
firms 
Firms 
without 
perform- 
ance pay 
 
Firms with 
perform- 
ance pay 
       
       
Within-firm 90-10 log 
 wage differential 
      
Unadjusted .697 .655 .737 .679 .628 .730 
Adjusted .609 .576 .639 .590 .552 .629 
       
Explanatory variables:       
Performance pay .513 0 1 .498 0 1 
Share union members .592 .670 .517 .610 .683 .535 
Log(Firm size) 4.492 4.498 4.486 4.522 4.556 4.488 
Firm age/100 .440 .476 .406 .495 .531 .459 
Share high education .221 .195 .245 .211 .196 .225 
Share low education .148 .162 .135 .154 .166 .142 
Share female .296 .308 .285 .288 .302 .275 
Industry:       
Oil, mining, energy .056 .038 .072 .047 .037 .057 
Nondurables (omitted) .194 .229 .162 .238 .275 .201 
Durables .209 .230 .189 .253 .263 .243 
Construction .074 .046 .100 .069 .039 .099 
Wholesale .113 .066 .158 .113 .061 .166 
Retail .047 .048 .046 .044 .044 .045 
Transportation .073 .108 .039 .059 .090 .028 
Post & telecom .015 .018 .011 0 0 0 
Finance .036 .030 .041 .029 .032 .026 
Business services .111 .070 .150 .080 .048 .113 
Health .030 .051 .010 .029 .051 .007 
Education, pers 
services 
.038 .057 .021 .038 .060 .015 
       
Observations 2,406 1,310 
     
 
Note: The adjusted 90-10 differential is based on the residuals from a regression of individual log wages on 
educational attainment (seven levels); age and its square; interactions between each education level and the age 
polynomial; immigrant status; union membership; gender and interactions between gender and all other 
characteristics; an indicator variable for year of observation and interactions between the year variable and all 
other regressors; and firm-by-year fixed effects. The first-step regression has 292,690 observations.    
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Table 2: Firm Log Wage Regressions 
     
        
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
        
Performance  .090*** .066*** .025*** .022** .018** .035*** .028*** 
pay (.011) (.009) (.007) (.009) (.008) (.009) (.009) 
        
Share    -.010 -.001 .040* -.029** .016 
union   (.012) (.014) (.022) (.014) (.023) 
        
log(Firm    .035*** .034*** -.014* .038*** .004 
size)   (.003) (.004) (.008) (.004) (.009) 
        
Firm    .005 .016  -.010  
age/100   (.009) (.011)  (.011)  
        
Share high    .364*** .359*** .066 .303*** .007 
educ   (.022) (.029) (.076) (.029) (.080) 
        
Share low    -.232*** -.273*** -.175** -.225*** -.127 
educ   (.038) (.050) (.073) (.049) (.078) 
        
Share    -.161*** -.130*** -.087 -.107*** -.077 
female   (.020) (.024) (.067) (.024) (.071) 
        
Controls:        
Individual 
charact. 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed 
effects step 2 
No No No No Yes No Yes 
Observations 2,406 2,406 2,406 1,310 1,310 1,385 1,310 
Note   Balanced panel Restricted individual 
sample 
 
***/**/* Significant at 1/5/10 percent level. 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable in column (1) is the mean 
establishment log wage. Dependent variable in columns (2)-(7) is the year-specific establishment fixed effect 
from the first-step regression described in the note to Table 1. Second-step regressions are weighted by the 
observation count of the firm-by-year cell in the first-step regression sample multiplied by the sampling weight 
for the firm. Inclusion in the second-step regression requires at least ten observations in the firm-by-year cell. 
The sample in columns (4) and (5) is restricted to the balanced panel of firms. In columns (6) and (7), the firm 
wage effect is computed from the subsample of individuals working at the same establishment both years. 
Second-step regressions also control for year of observation and industry (12 major industries).   
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Table 3: Firm Log Wage Regressions with Union Interaction 
 
      
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
      
Performance pay .054*** .023 .004 .044** .033* 
 (.014) (.018) (.017) (.018) (.019) 
      
Share union * -.048** -.001 .021 -.014 -.008 
  Performance pay (.020) (.025 ) (.023) (.025) (.025) 
      
Share union .016 .001 .031 -.021 .019 
 (.016) (.020) (.024) (.019) (.026) 
      
log(Firm size) .035*** .034*** -.015* .038*** .004 
 (.003) (.004) (.008) (.004) (.009) 
      
Firm age/100 .005 .016  -.010  
 (.009) (.011 )  (.011)  
      
Share high educ .364*** .359*** .065 .303*** .008 
 (.022) (.029) (.076) (.029) (.080) 
      
Share low educ -.233*** -.273*** -.173** -.225*** -.128 
 (.037) (.050) (.073) (.049) (.078) 
      
Share female -.165*** -.130*** -.086 -.108*** -.078 
 (.020) (.024) (.067) (.024) (.071) 
      
Firm fixed effects No No Yes No Yes 
Observations 2,406 1,310 1,310 1,385 1,310 
Note  Balanced panel of firms Restricted individual sample 
 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is the year-specific establishment fixed 
effect from the individual regression described in the note to Table 1. Second-step regressions are weighted by 
the observation count of the firm-by-year cell in the first-step regression sample multiplied by the sampling 
weight for the firm. Inclusion in the second-step regression requires at least ten observations in the firm-by-year 
cell. The sample in columns (2), (3), and (5) is restricted to balanced panel of firms. In columns (4) and (5), the 
firm wage effect is computed from the subsample of individuals working at the same establishment both years. 
Second-step regressions also control for year of observation and major industry. 
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Table 4: Within-Firm 90-10 Log Wage Differential Regressions 
 
       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
       
Performance pay .077*** .056*** .041*** .070*** .136*** .104*** 
 (.012) (.010) (.010) (.020) (.026) (.034) 
       
Share union *    -.047* -.131*** -.134*** 
  Performance pay    (.028) (.036) (.046) 
       
Share union   -.163*** -.137*** -.101*** -.003 
   (.016) (.022) (.029) (.047) 
       
log(Firm size)   .015*** .015*** .006 -.024 
   (.004) (.004) (.006) (.016) 
       
Firm age/100   -.059*** -.059*** -.084***  
   (.012) (.012) (.016)  
       
Share high educ   -.048 -.049 -.024 .064 
   (.031) (.031) (.042) (.149) 
       
Share low educ   .219*** .217*** .239*** .266* 
   (.052) (.052) (.073) (.145) 
       
Share female   .323*** .319*** .278*** .271** 
   (.027) (.027) (.035) (.132) 
       
Year=2003 .037*** .048*** .043*** .043*** .050*** .060*** 
 (.012) (.010) (.010) (.010) (.012) (.010) 
       
Constant .638*** .555*** .486*** .471*** .499***  
 (.010) (.009) (.028) (.029) (.038)  
       
Firm fixed effects No No No No No Yes 
Observations 2,406 2,406 2,406 2,406 1,310 1,310 
   Balanced panel 
 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is the within-establishment difference 
between the 90th and the 10th percentile log wage residual from the step-one regression described in the note to 
Table 1, except for in column (1) where the dependent variable is the observed 90-10 log wage differential at the 
establishment. Regressions are weighted by the observation count of the firm-by-year cell in the first-step 
regression sample multiplied by the sampling weight for the firm. Inclusion in the second-step regression 
requires at least ten observations in the firm-by-year cell. The sample in columns (5) and (6) is restricted to 
balanced panel of firms. Regressions in columns (3)-(6) also control for 12 major industries. 
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Table 5: Within-Firm 90-50 and 50-10 Log Wage Differential Regressions 
  
       
 90-50  50-10 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
       
Performance pay .040*** .060*** .048*** .030* .075*** .056** 
 (.010) (.013) (.016) (.016) (.020) (.028) 
       
Share union * -.038*** -.054*** -.057*** -.009 -.077*** -.077** 
  Performance pay (.0134 (.018) (.021) (.022) (.028) (.037) 
       
Share union -.075*** -.071*** .027 -.062*** -.031 -.030 
 (.010) (.014) (.022) (.018) (.022) (.039) 
       
log(Firm size) .013*** .007*** -.011 .002 -.001 -.013 
 (.002) (.003) (.007) (.003) (.004) (.013) 
       
Firm age/100 -.012** -.017**  -.047*** -.067***  
 (.006) (.008)  (.010) (.013)  
       
Share high educ .092*** .081*** .028 -.141*** -.105*** .037 
 (.015) (.021) (.069) (.025) (.033) (.122) 
       
Share low educ .095*** .141*** .089 .129*** .099* .177 
 (.025) (.036) (.067) (.040) (.057) (.118) 
       
Share female .065*** .053*** .009 .255*** .225*** .261** 
 (.013) (.017) (.061) (.022) (.027) (.107) 
       
Year=2003 .011** .021*** .023*** .032*** .029*** .037*** 
 (.005) (.006) (.005) (.008) (.010) (.008) 
       
Constant .215*** .229***  .256*** .270***  
 (.014) (.019)  (.023) (.030)  
       
Firm fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 2,406 1,310 1,310 2,406 1,310 1,310 
  Balanced panel  Balanced panel 
 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable in columns (1) – (3) is the within-
establishment difference between the 90th and the 50th percentile log wage residual from the step one regression 
described in note to Table 1. Columns (4)–(6) display results for the 50-10 log wage differential. Second-step 
regressions are weighted by the observation count of the firm-by-year cell in the first-step regression sample 
multiplied by the sampling weight for the firm. Inclusion in the second-step regression requires at least ten 
observations in the firm-by-year cell. The sample in columns (2), (3), (5) and (6) is restricted to the balanced 
panel of firms. Second-step regressions also control for 12 major industries. 
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Table 6: 90th and 10th Percentile Firm Log Wage Regressions  
 
       
 90th Percentile 10th Percentile 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
       
Performance pay .039*** .060*** .052*** -.031** -.075*** -.052** 
 (.009) (.012) (.015) (.013) (.017) (.023) 
       
Share union * -.031** -.053*** -.064*** .016 .077*** .070** 
  Performance pay (.013) (.016) (.020) (.018) (.024) (.031) 
       
Share union -.071*** -.063*** .007 .066*** .039** .011 
 (.010) (.013) (.020) (.015) (.019) (.032) 
       
log(Firm size) .012*** .006** -.011 -.003 .000 .013 
 (.002) (.002) (.007) (.003) (.004) (.011) 
       
Firm age/100 -.021*** -.028***  .038*** .056***  
 (.005) (.007)  (.008) (.010)  
       
Share high educ .026** .021 -.013 .075*** .045* -.077 
 (.014) (.019) (.064) (.020) (.028) (.102) 
       
Share low educ .107*** .134*** .107* -.110*** -.105** -.159 
 (.023) (.033) (.062) (.034) (.047) (.099) 
       
Share female .115*** .100*** .055 -.110*** -.118*** -.215** 
 (.012) (.016) (.056) (.034) (.023) (.090) 
       
Firm fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 2,406 1,310 1,310 2,406 1,310 1,310 
  Balanced panel  Balanced panel 
 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is the within-establishment 90th or 10th 
percentile log wage residual from the step one regression described in note to Table 1. Second-step regressions 
are weighted by the observation count of the firm-by-year cell in the first-step regression sample multiplied by 
the sampling weight for the firm. Inclusion in the second-step regression requires at least ten observations in the 
firm-by-year cell. Second-step regressions also control for year of observation and major industry. 
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Table 7: Individual and Group-based Performance Pay  
 
  
Probit regressions 
 Probability of 
introducing 
performance 
pay during 
1997-2003 
 
Probability of 
group-bonuses, 
given 
introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
Wage differentials (90-10) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
    
      
Share union -.210*** 
(.075) 
.243** 
(.108) 
-.176*** 
(.027) 
-.209*** 
(.033) 
-.140*** 
(.042) 
      
Performance pay   .069*** 
(.017) 
.077*** 
(.024) 
.102*** 
(.027) 
      
Performance Pay* 
Group-bonuses 
  -.034* 
(.019) 
-.054** 
(.025) 
-.063* 
(.038) 
      
log(Firm size)   .016** 
(.006) 
.009 
(.009) 
-.028* 
(.016) 
      
Firm age/100   -.050*** 
(.018) 
-.087*** 
(.025) 
 
      
Share high educ   -.030 
(.044) 
-.003 
(.065) 
.141 
(.149) 
      
Share low educ   .378*** 
(.078) 
.456*** 
(.110) 
.287** 
(.138) 
      
Share female   .283*** 
(.039) 
.234*** 
(.052) 
.489*** 
(.116) 
      
      
Sample Firms without 
performance 
pay in 1997 
Firms that 
introduced 
performance 
pay during 
1997-2003 
Cross-section 
2003 
Balanced panel 
2003 obs 
Balanced panel 
1997 and 2003 
obs 
Outcome    90-10 in 2003 90-10 in 2003 Change 90-10, 
1997-03 
Observations 400 179 1233 655 655 
      
 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Estimates in columns (1) and (2) are based on probit models; 
reported are marginal effects (dP/dX). In columns (3)-(5), the dependent variable is the within-establishment 90-
10 log wage differential, where individual wages are residuals from the step one regression described in the note 
to Table 1. Regressions are weighted by the observation count of the firm-by-year cell in the first-step regression 
sample multiplied by the sampling weight for the firm. Inclusion in the second-step regression requires at least 
ten observations in the firm-by-year cell. Regressions in cols. (3)-(5) also control for major industry. 
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Appendix 
Pay determination within the firm is modeled as the outcome of constrained profit 
maximization, subject to various constraints that differ across pay regimes.  
 
The Nonunion Firm  
In the case of a firm without union representation, the Lagrangian is given by 
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Here, the outside option constraint is always binding, while only one of the incentive 
constraints is binding, depending on the pay regime.   
 
Case 1: Fixed Pay (FP); 0,i i ib z zξ= = =  
Inserting the expression for individual effort, iz z= , the first order conditions are  
 
1 1
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Case 2: Individual Performance Pay (PP); 0iz τ= =  
Inserting /i i iz b p c= , the first order conditions read  
2 2 2
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 , 
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The Union Bargaining Case 
For the unionized firm, the Lagrangian is given by 
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Relative to the nonunion case, the individual outside option constraints are replaced by the 
(given) union utility constraint.  
 
Case 3: Union Fixed Pay (UFP); 0,i ib z z= =  
Inserting iz z= , the first order conditions are 
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Note also that, when 
1
, exp( ) ln( ) /
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i
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=
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Case 4: Union Individualized Performance Pay (UPP); 0z = ,  bi > 0 
Inserting /i iz bp c= , the first order conditions read  
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and ln( ) /u aψ = − . 
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Case 5: Group Performance Pay (GPP);  
 
The optimal effort standard is given by  
( ) 0
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Note that in this case the piece rate is labeled β, instead of b. As the Lagrangian reads  
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and the first order conditions are   
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When combined, the first order conditions give the expression for the optimal group rate, 
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